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Revitalizing Section 5 of the FTC Act Using
“Consumer Choice” Analysis
Robert H. Lande
The ongoing debate over the breadth and nature of Section 5 of the FTC Act has intensified due
to the outcome of the recent Presidential election. Some call for or predict a much broader and
more aggressive approach to Section 5. Others caution that reviewing courts will not permit an
overly expansive interpretation of Section 5 unless it is clearly bounded by a structure that will pre-
vent it from becoming untethered and standardless.
In this article, I propose that the use of the consumer choice framework would be the best and
perhaps the only way to revitalize Section 5 in a manner that is definite, predictable, principled,
and clearly bounded. This approach would focus attention on the factors that are important for a
market to function competitively, including variety and quality, as well as price. It also would pro-
vide a relatively clear way for businesses and courts to distinguish anticompetitive conduct from
procompetitive or benign conduct. If the Commission were to adopt the consumer choice limita-
tions, the Act would be given the broad interpretation Congress intended, and this reinvigorated
interpretation would be likely to be sustained by reviewing courts.
Section 5 of the FTC Act Is Significantly Broader than the Other Antitrust Laws
There is no doubt that when Congress enacted Section 5 of the FTC Act, it intended the law to be
more aggressive than the Sherman and Clayton Acts.1 The legislative history and Supreme Court
decisions2 demonstrate that Section 5 was intended to cover incipient violations of the other
antitrust laws, conduct violating the spirit of the other antitrust laws, conduct violating recognized
standards of business behavior, and conduct violating competition policy as framed by the
Commission.3 Even though reasonable people may differ as to whether the FTC Act should be
more expansive than the other antitrust laws, congressional intent concerning this point is clear.4
Some might question the propriety of subjecting conduct to a different, tougher legal standard
when it is challenged under Section 5 of the FTC Act. For example, one might ask why an exclu-
sive dealing arrangement should be evaluated under an incipiency standard when it is challenged
under the FTC Act, but not when challenged under the Sherman Act? 5 One answer is that
Sherman Act violations lead to automatic treble damages and award of attorneys’ fees to victori-
ous plaintiffs.6 By contrast, there is no private right of action under the FTC Act, and FTC Act vio-
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1 See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV.
227, 233, 251, 271 (1979–1980).
2 See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–44 (1972).
3 See Averitt, supra note 1, at 228–29, 242, 251, 271, 275.
4 See id. at 229–38.
5 For the current legal treatment of exclusive dealing arrangements under the Sherman Act, see the sources cited infra note 31.
6 See 15 U.S.C. §15(a).
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lations are not precedents that lead to private litigation unless an FTC decision specifically finds
a Sherman Act or Clayton Act violation; a “pure” FTC Act violation would not do this.7 Moreover,
mergers already are judged under two different laws that employ two different standards. Mergers
can potentially violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act,8 but only if they violate a monopolization stan-
dard. Mergers also can violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, where they are scrutinized under a
much stricter incipiency standard.9 In other words, despite the existence of the 1890 Sherman Act,
Congress wanted mergers challenged more aggressively, so in 1914 it enacted the Clayton Act.
Similarly, Congress believed that the Sherman Act was not aggressive, flexible, or broad enough,10
so in 1914 it enacted the FTC Act.
However, the Supreme Court case law addressing Congress’ intent in enacting Section 5 is rel-
atively old.11 There is no guarantee today’s more conservative12 Court would interpret Section 5
expansively today. If the Commission were to attempt to promulgate an approach to the FTC Act
that was vague, insufficiently bounded, or that gave it undue discretion, more conservative review-
ing courts today might well restrict the scope of Section 5 and make it coterminous with the other
antitrust laws, no matter how clear the congressional intent and no matter what the older case law
holds. A narrower interpretation of Section 5 would be especially likely if the Commission were to
articulate the scope of Section 5 in non-economic terms, such as by forbidding conduct that is
“unjust,” “oppressive,” or “immoral.” Fortunately, the Commission does have a way to minimize the
risk of reversal on appeal.
Section 5 Can Be Expansive If, But Only If, It Is Constrained by the Choice Framework
Section 5 prohibits conduct that constitutes “unfair methods of competition” (which, in this article,
I call Section 5 antitrust violations) as well as conduct that constitutes “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices” (which, in this article, I call Section 5 consumer protection violations).13 The choice
framework would impose a threshold requirement that every Section 5 antitrust violation signifi-
cantly impairs the choices that free competition brings to the marketplace.14 The choice framework
also would impose the requirement that every Section 5 consumer protection violation significantly
impairs consumers’ ability meaningfully to choose from among the options the market provides.
Construed this way, the two halves of Section 5, operating together, ensure that consumers have
7 See Averitt, supra note 1, at 251 n.112; see also id. at 253 n.116, 299 n.303.
8 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Illegal conduct can include
corporate mergers. See LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:41
(4th ed. 2003).
9 See Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von’s Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 875, 876 (2001).
10 See Averitt, supra note 1, at 228–29, 233, 242, 251, 271, 275.
11 The Supreme Court’s most recent expansive interpretation of Section 5 occurred more than twenty years ago in FTC v. Indiana Federation
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986), where the Court characterized Section 5 to include traditional antitrust violations and also “practices
that the Commission determines are against public policy for other reasons.”
12 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study 6, tbl.3 (U. Chi. Law & Economics, Olin Working
Paper No. 404, May 23, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126403 (documenting that a large proportion of the most conserva-
tive Supreme Court justices of recent decades are serving on the Court today).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
14 See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using The “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 182 (2007)
[hereinafter Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach]; see also Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory
of Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 718–20 (1997) [hereinafter Consumer Sovereignty].
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the two ingredients needed to exercise effective sovereignty—a competitive array of options and
the ability to choose meaningfully from among these options.15 Antitrust law prevents restraints that
would restrict the competitive array of options in the marketplace, ensuring these competitive
options are undiminished by artificial restrictions, such as price fixing or anticompetitive mergers.
Consumer protection law then ensures that consumers are able to make a reasonably free and
rational selection from among those options, unimpeded by artificial constraints, such as decep-
tion or the withholding of material information. In this way, the two halves of Section 5 together pro-
tect a free market economy.
By contrast, conduct not causing either type of problem should not violate Section 5 of the FTC
Act. Conduct not unduly restricting the options available in the marketplace should not be an
antitrust violation, and conduct not unduly restricting consumers’ ability to chose from among
these options should not constitute a consumer protection violation.
The choice approach to antitrust, instead of a price or efficiency approach,16 has the advan-
tage of explaining accurately, simply and intuitively, in a way that is easy to understand, why
antitrust is good for consumer welfare.17 Under a consumer choice standard, factors like innova-
tion, perspectives,18 quality and safety would in effect be moved up from the footnotes, where they
are all too-often forgotten, into the text, where they would play a more prominent role in the
antitrust evaluation. When antitrust law is construed and applied within the consumer choice
framework, it will change some antitrust analysis because it will give greater emphasis to such
short term issues as quality and variety competition, and to such long term issues as competitive
innovation, ideas, and perspectives. It would make a difference in several broad categories of
cases where a price or efficiency approach to antitrust often would lead to the wrong result.19 The
consumer choice framework could also lead to more aggressive enforcement,20 but would do so
in a predictable, principled manner.
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15 The converse, however, is not correct. It is not true that everything that reduces consumer choice is an antitrust violation, or that every-
thing that reduces consumers’ ability to choose from among the options the market provides is a consumer protection violation. What is
true is that every antitrust violation reduces or distorts the choices that are on the market. It also is true that every consumer protection
violation reduces or distorts consumers’ ability to choose from among the options the market provides. Averitt & Lande, Consumer
Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 715–22.
16 For specific differences between the consumer choice, price and efficiency approaches, see Averitt & Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice”
Approach, supra note 14, at 185–89.
17 The choice framework should also be applied to Sherman Act and Clayton Act cases. Fortunately, there is reason to believe that all antitrust
jurisprudence is slowly evolving in this direction. Id. at 263–64.
18 Competition in terms of perspectives arises most meaningfully in the media contest. See id. at 206–12.
19 There are several categories of cases where courts have reached the wrong results, and would be likely to reach the right results if they had
used the choice approach. The first category involves conduct in markets with little or no price competition, as may occur with certain types
of regulation. In these situations, no avenues exist for properly assessing consumer welfare without focusing explicitly on non-price
issues. For these markets a price standard would be inadequate because our main concern is artificially diminished consumer choice. See
id. at 196–99.
A second category of cases for which the consumer choice approach would work better involves conduct that increases consumers’
search costs or otherwise impairs their decision-making ability. Such conduct tends to cause consumers to obtain products or services less
suited to their needs, as well as to produce adverse effects on price. There are a large number of examples, including the advertising restric-
tion cases and similar cases that involve collusion to raise consumer search costs. Id. at 199–201.
Finally, there are cases involving markets in which firms compete primarily through independent product development and creativity,
rather than through price. These markets may involve high-tech innovation or editorial independence in the news media. Id. at 201–22.
20 Id. at 196–222.
Three Examples: Cases Similar to N-Data, Invitations to Collude, and Incipient
Exclusive Dealing and Tying Violations
In this section I provide three examples of ways that Section 5 usefully could be construed and
applied more expansively than the other antitrust laws. I will also briefly show how the choice
framework would beneficially assist in the analysis of each example, and raise the probability of
a reviewing court sustaining a decision by the Commission.
1. Cases Similar to N-Data. The FTC’s action in the Negotiated Data Solutions (N-Data) case
should be applauded,21 and the Commission commended for condemning the opportunistic
behavior at issue and affirming that conduct can be an antitrust violation of the FTC Act even if it
does not violate the Sherman Act.22
The issues in N-Data never reached a reviewing court, but the next time the Commission
decides a similar case the issues could be appealed. The FTC’s approach to such cases would
be more likely to be sustained if it were supplemented by “consumer choice” limitations that make
it clearer and more predictable why the conduct at issue was challenged.
It is not completely clear that the conduct at issue in N-Data would have violated the Sherman
Act. It could be argued that the conduct only constituted the exploitation of intellectual property
rights, in which case it might not have violated the Sherman Act. It could also be argued that the
case does not clearly involve an act of monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
because the original patent holder adhered to its agreement, and the successor holder was just
exploiting its newly acquired parent rights, rather than taking improper steps to acquire or main-
tain monopoly power.23 In light of this uncertainty, it is fortunate the Commission was able to use
Section 5 of the FTC Act to challenge the anticompetitive conduct at issue.
Even though the Commission’s N-Data decision came to the right result, the majority opinion’s
overall articulation of its “unfairness” standard risks attack for being unduly indefinite. The
Commission correctly noted: “The legislative history from the debate regarding the creation of the
Commission is replete with references to the types of conduct that Congress intended the
Commission to challenge” including conduct that is “unjust, inequitable or . . . contrary to good
morals.”24 Despite the clear legislative intent to give the Commission the power to define, chal-
lenge, and condemn such conduct, doing so arguably would give the Commission too much dis-
cretion. Any Commission assertion that conduct violates Section 5 because it is “unjust,
inequitable or . . . contrary to good morals” also could be criticized as not providing sufficient
notice to businesses as to what specific conduct is illegal.
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21 See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File No. 051 0094, 2008 WL 4407246 (Sept. 22, 2008) (complaint and consent order), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122statement.pdf.
22 Id.
23 There was free and fair competition at the time presentations were made in the early 1990s by owners of different technologies to the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), a standard-setting organization, in connection with the selection of a standard to facil-
itate interoperability between Ethernet technologies. In that connection the IEEE accepted the offer of National Semiconductor in 1994 to
license its technology (which accomplished the desired objective) for a one-time fee of $1000 (a price far below the monopoly level).
After roughly eight years, following transfer of the pertinent patents to a new owner, the new owner increased its royalty demand. Rather
than honor the price that had been established through the competitive standard-setting process, due to lock-in effects consumers pur-
chasing from licensees were forced to pay higher prices to cover the increased licensing fees. This was a significant change to the (price)
choice that competition had brought to the marketplace roughly eight years earlier. The conduct therefore quite properly was found to vio-
late Section 5 of the FTC Act. See N-Data, 2008 WL 4407246.
24 See Statement of Commission at 1–2, N-Data, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122statement.pdf (citations omitted).
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However, N-Data’s conduct did artificially remove important consumer choices that would have
arisen if competition had been set by the free market.25 For this reason, it would have been con-
demned if the Commission had utilized the choice approach. Moreover, because the choice
framework carefully relies upon an extensive body of earlier Commission “unfairness” policy state-
ments and opinions, as well as court decisions, it would have helped inoculate the Commission’s
opinion against the charge that it provided inadequate notice that the conduct in question was ille-
gal. Additionally, the consumer choice limitation would help reassure the antitrust and business
communities that the Commission is not evaluating conduct on an ad hoc, unprincipled basis.
When a case like N-Data is appealed, the reviewing courts would be more likely to give defer-
ence to the FTC’s interpretation of Section 5 if “unfairness” were limited to practices that signifi-
cantly interfere with consumer choice, rather than if the Commission uses “fuzzier” concepts
such as “unjust,” “inequitable,” or “contrary to good morals.” The consumer choice limitation also
would provide bounds that would demonstrate that the Commission was not seeking open ended
powers. This should help convince reviewing courts to give the Commission the considerable def-
erence it deserves when it goes beyond traditional Sherman Act violations.
2. Invitations to Collude. Invitations to collude can violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.26
However, for enforcers to prove a Sherman Act violation they must undertake several formidable
tasks.27 First, they must prove a relevant market, a complex and time-consuming undertaking.
Then the enforcers must prove that the challenged conduct was anticompetitive (as that term has
been defined) and that it would result in either the respondent’s achieving or maintaining monop-
oly power or the “dangerous probability” of its achieving monopoly power. This analysis would
have to show harm to competition, including a careful analysis of barriers to entry. Lastly, claimed
efficiencies associated with the practices would have to be litigated.28 Like every successful
Section 2 action, these cases would be complex, lengthy, and costly.
By contrast, naked collusion cases are much less complicated. In these cases the enforcers
do not have to define markets, prove difficulty of entry or any form of market power, litigate effi-
ciencies, or establish actual anticompetitive effects.29
Invitation to collude cases should be as easy to prove as collusion cases. The same jurispru-
dential reasons that permit the enforcers to dispense with the complex, costly and lengthy mar-
ket definition and market power issues in collusion cases also apply to invitations to collude
cases. Moreover, invitations to collude can comfortably be characterized as conduct that signifi-
cantly risks impairing the price or other choices that the marketplace otherwise would provide to
consumers, and thus fit comfortably within the consumer choice framework. They should, as the
Commission has concluded,30 violate Section 5 of the FTC Act without requiring the Commission
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25 If the Commission adopted the self-limiting principle that every antitrust violation must significantly impair the choices that free competi-
tion would have brought to the marketplace, in the N-Data case the choice option of concern would have been the price of the products in
question. At the time of the original presentations to the IEEE, the presentations should have been forced to fully compete with each other
in terms of price options (as well as quality options). The IEEE should have been free to select as its preferred technological option the one
with the lowest long term cost.
26 United States v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114, 1121 (5th Cir. 1984) (“attempted monopolization may be established by proof of a solic-
itation along with the requisite intent”).
27 See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK ch. 3 (2006).
28 Id. at 73–74.
29 Id. at 228–29. This is not to suggest that collusion cases are simple. Collusion cases are, however, far less complex than Section 2 cases.
30 Valassis Commc’ns, Inc., FTC File No. 051 0008 (Mar. 14, 2006) (Analysis to Aid Public Comment), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0510008/060314ana0510008.pdf.
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to undertake the Herculean tasks of proving the traditional Sherman Act requirements. This would
save money for the taxpayer and also lead to faster and more reliable results.
3. Incipient Exclusive Dealing and Tying Violations. There is substantial uncertainty over the
market share required to establish a tying violation, and the amount of foreclosure necessary for
an exclusive dealing violation.31
Similar uncertainty exists over how much pressure or inducement, in the form of a discount or
other conduct, must exist before an arrangement will be termed a “tying” or “exclusive dealing”
arrangement.32
The traditional market share requirements and degree of certainty over whether an effective
tie or exclusive dealing arrangement should be found to exist should be relaxed when the case
involves a defendant with a significantly larger market share than that of the plaintiff. In these
“incipient” tying or exclusive dealing situations, incumbents often will be able to disadvantage sig-
nificantly smaller competitors or would-be entrants because their market share is larger, even if it
is not large enough for a traditional Sherman Act violation. Suppose, for example, a company intro-
duces a new brand of super-premium ice cream. Suppose also that an existing seller of super-pre-
mium ice cream has 30 percent of this market, and also another 30 percent of the premium and
non-premium ice cream markets. Then suppose the incumbent firm tells supermarkets that they
have to choose between the established firm’s products and the newcomer’s products. No effi-
ciencies would arise if the established firm’s demands were met.
These facts, including defendant’s low market share, would be unlikely to constitute either a
tying or exclusive dealing case.33 Moreover, market definition and market power or foreclosure
issues would be extremely difficult, lengthy, and costly to litigate. However, if the incumbent’s
exclusionary strategy succeeded, consumer choice in this market, in terms of varieties of ice
cream on the market, would be diminished for the short term. Moreover, successful exclusion
would risk diminishing incentives to innovate and enter by non-incumbents in the long term. This
conduct should violate Section 5 as an incipient exclusive dealing or tying arrangement.34
The consumer choice framework helps explain why incipient tying and exclusive dealing
arrangements should violate Section 5. Its focus on actual or potential choice in the marketplace
should also increase predictability for the business community and make it more likely that review-
ing courts would uphold the Commission’s determinations. Moreover, treating incipient exclusive
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31 See Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 27, §§ 7.2, 7.3; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE ch. 10 (3d ed. 2005). The market shares and market power required can be similar to those required for Section 2 violations
as some commentators suggest: “courts require a significantly lower foreclosure share in Sherman Act § 2 cases than in Sherman Act §1
cases.” See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 530 (2007).
32 See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 31, at 623–33.
33 For the necessary requirements, see id. at 382–87, 404–05, 435–39.
34 A similar exclusive dealing case where a diminution of consumer choice occurred was in J.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., 485
F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2007). Although the Wyeth case was vastly more complicated than the ice cream hypothetical, the conduct at issue was
bundled discounts, in the form of rebates, that were tantamount to an exclusive dealing arrangement. Id. at 884–85. The conduct offered
no significant efficiencies and resulted in the serious possibility of diminished consumer choice in the conjugated estrogen market. See id.
at 886 (One of Wyeth’s clients, Express Scripts, wanted to renegotiate its contract with Wyeth because a small group of Scripts’ customers
insisted on having the other product, Cenestin, available but defendant refused and reminded Script that 40 million dollars in rebates per
year would be at risk if it made the other product available). The defendant’s exclusionary strategy could have significantly diminished an
important aspect of consumer choice in the short term, regardless whether prices were affected by its conduct. Moreover, successful exclu-
sion would risk diminishing incentives to innovate and enter by non-incumbents in the long term. Unfortunately, the court focused on price,
rather than consumer choice, and did not condemn the conduct in question. Id. at 886–91. Regardless whether the conduct should have
been found to constitute a Section 2 violation, it should be a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
dealing or tying arrangements as a violation of Section 5 would advance international harmo-
nization in an increasingly globalized economy by beneficially moving U.S. antitrust law in the
direction of European Union competition law.35
Conclusion
In conclusion, Section 5 of the FTC Act should be interpreted to be significantly broader than the
other antitrust laws. But this expansive mandate only should be used within the consumer choice
framework.
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35 See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 31, at 496–97, 531–44, 601–03, 618–23.
